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Abstract 
The X-by-Wire systems in cars can only be accepted if 
they provide at least the same dependability than the 
traditional ones. In this paper we propose a new 
approach to evaluate the impact of the EMI 
perturbations on the dependability of an X-by-Wire 
architecture. The considered X-by-Wire architecture is 
distributed around a TDMA-like communication 
protocol. So a perturbation causes the loss of a 
communication cycle with a certain probability. The 
vehicle level failure is then defined as the consecutive 
loss of a certain number of communication cycles. Its 
reliability is modeled as that of the well-known 
consecutive-k-out-of-n:F systems. A case study, together 
with the EMI perturbations collected on the roads in 
France, is used to illustrate our approach. 
 
1. Introduction 
For the last decade, an increasing number of functions 
in a car are ensured by electronic systems. This 
evolution, formerly confined to functions such as engine 
control, now affects almost all car domains: wipers, 
lights, air condition, door controls, braking assistance, 
etc. In the future, even critical functions such as throttle, 
brake or steering will be fully controlled by electronic 
systems leading to the X-by-Wire concept. As any 
dysfunction of Steer-by-Wire, Brake-by-Wire or 
Throttle-by-Wire systems would jeopardize the safety of 
the occupants and of the environment of a car, it is 
necessary to prove that such a system respects the safety 
and more generally dependability requirements. It is a 
challenging problem to prove such properties because of 
the lack of experience in the automotive industry with X-
by-Wire systems and because of the complexity of these 
systems.  
Several techniques are available for dependability 
assessment [1]. In particular, on the one hand, fault 
forecasting based on hardware architectures and on the 
permanent faults that may affect their hardware 
components and on the other hand, faults that can occur 
during the specification, the design and the coding of 
software components are nowadays well mastered in 
automotive industry. Nevertheless, these techniques are 
not sufficient for ensuring dependability properties.  
In fact, an X-by-Wire system is a control system that 
is, for topological reasons, implemented on a distributed 
architecture and that has to respect stringent time 
constraints (for example, an end-to-end time constraint 
between the solicitation of the driver and its effect on the 
physical equipment, brake or front axle, is about tens 
milliseconds). This means that an implementation has to 
respect the required timing properties and their 
verification must take into account the system behavior 
specification and the deployment characteristics 
(processor power, network throughput, local scheduling 
policies, protocols).  
Moreover, any embedded system is sensitive to 
external physical conditions such as high or low 
temperatures, EMI (Electromagnetic interferences) 
perturbations, etc. that are the sources of transient faults. 
Due to the distributed aspect of the system, any transient 
fault may lead to additional sensing to actuation delays 
(for example, on a CAN network, a transmission error 
leads to the retransmission of the erroneous packet) or 
loss of data packets (for example, in a time-triggered 
architecture based on TTP/C or FlexRay). Therefore, the 
classic dependability analysis of a system by only taking 
into account the permanent faults and the temporal 
system behavior verification (e.g. real-time 
schedulability analysis) disregarding the transient faults 
that can affect the system are necessary but not sufficient 
to guarantee the total dependability requirements.  
In this paper, we propose a contribution to the 
quantitative evaluation of the dependability and, more 
precisely the safety, for X-by-Wire systems that focuses 
on transient faults caused by the environment. Section 2 
discusses the safety issue in automotive industry by 
presenting first some possible standards for the X-by-
Wire system dependability assessment, then the different 
faults (and particularly the EMI perturbations) which can 
lead to system failures. Section 3 presents a steer-by-
wire architecture as our case study. Section 4 describes 
the approach we propose to evaluate the vehicle failure 
probability when it goes through an EMI perturbed zone 
and a set of such zones. Section 5 gives numerical results 
by considering a typical vehicle trajectory. Section 6 
concludes our findings and points out future work. 
Comparing to the approach we proposed earlier in [11], 
this paper brings new contributions on the EMI 
perturbation modelling and the mathematic and 
algorithmic evaluation methods of the vehicle failure 
probability (or safety). 
2. The safety issue in automotive industry 
2.1. Which standard for dependability assessment 
In several critical domains as nuclear plants, railways, 
avionics, safety requirements are very rigorous for 
software-based systems. A certification process has to be 
followed by the concerned industry in order to prove that 
the systems obey regulatory policies. At the moment, 
nothing similar exists in the automotive industry. 
Nevertheless, as it is a crucial problem for carmakers and 
suppliers, several proposals either based on the existing 
certification standards or on some new proposals are 
presently under study [2]. We can cite, for example: the 
RTCA/DO-178B [3] that is used in avionics, or the EN 
50128 [4], applied in the railway industry; these 
standards provide stringent guidelines for the 
development of an embedded system. The constraints 
imposed by these standards are too stringent for the 
automotive industry: software partitioning, intensive 
hardware redundancy, etc. Note that, nevertheless, a 
similar but looser approach is proposed by the Motor 
Industry Software Reliability Association (MISRA) [5]. 
Faced to these proposals, some studies conclude on the 
need of a quantitative approach (see PALBUS or Brite 
Euram 111 projects [6]). The same approach is favoured 
by the automotive actors [7]. So, the generic standard 
IEC 61508 [8], is, for the moment a good candidate for 
supporting a certification process in the automotive 
industry due to its specification of "safety integrity 
levels" (SIL) defined each by a quantitative safety 
requirement. The challenge is therefore to verify that a 
given system respects such a quantitative property. 
Notice that in this standard, the requirements are 
expressed in terms of failure probability per hour.  
In this paper, we show how to evaluate a failure 
probability along some reference situation (e.g. a typical 
vehicle trajectory); future work is on going for an 
evaluation per hour by considering a statistic situation.  
2.2. External transient faults 
The main sources for transient faults in an in-vehicle 
embedded system are the electromagnetic interferences 
and the temperature variations. Alpha particles, neutrons 
or electric shocks are some other sources of transient 
faults. Unfortunately, at the moment, their effect on the 
electronic component of a micro-controller is not well 
known and therefore, no realistic model. Nevertheless, as 
soon as such a model will be available, our approach will 
be able to integrate them. Furthermore, in this paper, we 
focus only on the effect of electromagnetic interference 
(see [9] for more details on the effects of temperature 
variations). 
Electromagnetic interferences are mainly caused by 
radio communication transmitters, radars, and high 
voltage lines. Their influence on electronic components 
depend on the frequency, power and level of the 
electromagnetic fields. Each carmaker specifies an 
internal regulatory policy that imposes the robustness of 
electronic component faced with electromagnetic 
interference sources under a given voltage level and for a 
given interval of frequencies. So a test process is applied 
on each electronic component in order to verify its 
conformity to the specific carmaker standard. 
Nevertheless, this conformity is just proved for given 
frequencies and voltage level. In fact, it is established 
that the testing condition are not met everywhere; it 
exists some traffic areas, for example near airports, 
where a vehicle can go through an area subject to a 
higher level of voltage and / or other frequencies than the 
specified ones and therefore, the probability that an in-
vehicle embedded system can be corrupted by 
electromagnetic interferences is not zero. In this paper, 
we will consider that the upper limit for the robustness 
assessment of electronic components is 100 V/m. This is 
to say that when a car goes through an EMI perturbed 
zone with a force higher than 100 volts per meter, its X-
by-Wire systems may exhibit errors.   
2.3. Areas under EMI  
Some sources of electromagnetic interferences are 
statically disposed along the road (for example, radars or 
high voltage lines). CEERF, a French project, funded by 
Ministry of Transport, proposed a characterization of the 
electromagnetic pollution for the French road system 
[10]. This project targeted mainly the automotive 
industry by proposing a cartography of the EMI sources 
and electromagnetic field levels in France and a method 
for its updating. In this paper, we apply our proposed 
method to a case study (see section 3) and the model of 
EMI faults is based on the results of this project. These 
results are obtained thanks to a monitor embedded in a 
car and whose role is to record the frequency and the 
level of the ambient electromagnetic field during a 
journey along several representative roads. From this 
recording, we are able to select the length (in km) of 
each area under EMI perturbation of higher than 100 
V/m (see figure 1; on the represented trajectory, two 
parts of this trajectory, areas Z1 and Z2, are subject to 
perturbations of more than 100V/m). 
distance (km)
Electric field
level (V/m)
100 V/m
0 V/m
Z1 Z2
Figure 1. Example of electric field level of a 
reference road  
In our study, since we are dealing with safety-critical 
systems, worst vehicle situations (e.g. vehicle is taking a 
bend at its maximum authorized speed when a 
perturbation occurs) are considered whenever possible. 
3. Case study 
In order to illustrate the proposed method we apply it 
on a case study that integrates the main functionalities of 
a Steer-by-Wire system (note that this case study was 
formerly presented in [11]).  
A Steer-by-Wire system aims to provide two main 
services: controlling the front axle actuation according to 
the driver's request and providing a "mechanical-like" 
force feedback to the hand wheel that is consistent with 
the current state of the vehicle. We assume in this study 
that these services are independent and we only focus on 
the "front axle actuation" service because it implies the 
most critical safety purpose.  
Figure 2 represents the computer-based architecture. 
Because of its safety criticality, redundancy is 
omnipresent. Three redundant sensors, S_HW1, S_HW2, 
S_HW3, measure the driver’s request (hand wheel angle 
and torque), two redundant actuators, FA_m1 and 
FA_m2, act on the front axle. Two redundant micro-
controllers are used for driver’s requests filtering, 
HW_ECU1 and HW_ECU2 while two other redundant 
micro-controllers, FA_ECU1 and FA_ECU2, are 
dedicated to the support of the control laws for the front 
axle movement. Finally, three redundant sensors 
(S_FA1, S_FA2 and S_FA3) measure the state of the 
front axle and two redundant actuators, HW_m1 and 
HW_m2, provide the force feedback on the hand wheel. 
The four micro-controllers are connected on the 
redundant channels of a TDMA-like network (could be 
TTP/C or FlexRay). 
 
S_HW1
S_HW2
S_HW3
HW_m1
S_FA1
S_FA2
S_FA3
Channel 2
front axle
HW_ECU1 HW_ECU2
Channel 1
FA_ECU1 FA_ECU2
FA_m1 FA_m2
hand wheel
HW_m2
 
Figure 2. A Steer-by-Wire architecture 
The application implementing the two services is 
deployed on this computer-based architecture. As said 
formerly, we focus on the service of "front axle actuation 
according to the driver’s request". Two important 
functions are necessary: the filtering of information 
measured near the hand wheel (driver’s request) and the 
evaluation of the order to give to the front axle actuators.  
The first function, termed Producer, gathers the 
measures of the three sensors and establishes the 
consolidated information (majority vote, consistency, 
etc.) that represents the driver’s request. This function is 
replicated onto the redundant micro-controllers, 
HW_ECU1 and HW_ECU2 and runs periodically. In the 
case study, the task realizing this function is periodic 
(period εt=2 ms); furthermore, we assume that it takes 
always the same time, dt, for the completion of each task 
instance on HW_ECU1 and HW_ECU2 and that dt is 
equal to some microseconds, so we disregard it in the 
following sections.  
The second function, called Consumer, aims to 
compute the order according to the driver’s request, the 
current vehicle situation and the current state of the front 
axle. It also runs periodically both on FA_ECU1 and 
FA_ECU2 and its period is based on the TDMA cycle. 
Note that, at the beginning of each period, this function 
requires the driver’s request that is transmitted thanks to 
the replicated channels of the network. Figure 3 presents 
the TDMA cycle configuration. In both HW_ECU1 and 
HW_ECU2, the driver’s request is packed into a frame 
(HWFr1 and HWFr2) and these frames are sent 
(respectively in slot S1 and slot S2) at each cycle and in 
the same way on both channels. The other slots of the 
cycle are not considered here.  
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Figure 3. TDMA cycle configuration 
The specification of the embedded application is then 
achieved by verifying that the Worst Case Pure Delay, 
WCPD, that is the greatest age of the information 
consumed at each start of the Consumer is less than the 
Worst Tolerable Delay, τmax, (defined as the maximum 
age of the driver’s request, measured at its consumption 
instant, that ensures the safety of the vehicle in an 
extreme situation; see [11] for more precision on the 
method of its evaluation); in this case, by applying this 
method,  we obtain max 18 .msτ =
PD d
 The Worst Case Pure 
Delay, is given by WC n t td msε ε+ + = 6,25 .= −  
So, this architecture respects the safety property under 
fault free case. (as said formerly, we disregard dt). Figure 
4 illustrates the evaluation of WCPD.  
4. Verification of safety constraints at 
vehicle level under EMI 
4.1. Proposition of metric for the quantitative 
evaluation of the behavioral reliability of an in-
vehicle embedded system 
 
We presented in [11] the concept of behavioral 
reliability as an attribute that characterizes the 
dependability of an embedded system. More precisely, it 
is defined as the ability of the embedded system to 
provide a service with respect to the safety of the vehicle 
and taking into account the system performances and 
fault tolerance capacity. The contribution of this paper is 
a fault forecasting approach thanks to the evaluation of 
an embedded system with respect to fault occurrences 
distribution. This evaluation is done on a model of this 
system and based on a fault injection technique. Finally, 
the metric proposed is the probability that a failure at 
vehicle level occurs while the vehicle crosses an area 
subject to EMI above the tolerable value (100 V/m, in 
this paper). 
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Figure 4. Worst Case Pure Delay evaluation: this 
occurs when the filtering activity on micro-controller 
HW_ECU1 or HW_ECU2 sends the value just after 
the start of the TDMA cycle 
For this purpose, we formalize the interaction 
between transient faults due to EMI and the safety of a 
vehicle (section 4.2). Then (section 4.3), we present the 
fault injection technique that provides a quantitative 
evaluation of this interaction. A system under EMI 
above 100 V/m is possibly corrupted; so in section 4.4, 
we furnish a formal expression for the term "possibly" 
and in section 4.5, we show how to measure the interval 
during which the system is possibly corrupted. Finally, 
the probabilistic technique applied for the metric 
evaluation is given in section 4.6.  
4.2. From transient fault to vehicle failure 
The verification method lies on the fact that the 
network used to transmit the driver’s request is based on 
a TDMA protocol. So we aim to define the worst 
situation that is tolerable by the Consumer function in 
terms of vehicle safety guarantee. For the identification 
of this worst case, we make some assumptions. 
• First, for focusing on the data production and 
transmission part, the failure probability of the 
micro-controllers, FA_ECU1 and FA_ECU2, and of 
the execution of the Consumer function (actuators) 
is not considered. In fact, these two parts can be 
separately studied. The total sensing to actuation 
failure probability can be obtained using classic 
reliability evaluation method. 
• Second, as commonly admitted, we consider that the 
two micro-controllers HW_ECU1 and HW_ECU2, 
are fail-silent (i.e. they produce either correct data or 
nothing) [12]. 
• Finally, the mechatronic delay, i.e. the time 
necessary for the actuator to reach the front axle 
position, is supposed to be constant. 
Under this hypothesis and considering the CRC-based 
error detection, and the temporal / spatial replications of 
transmitted data, the probability that an erroneous data 
would not be detected by the Consumer function can be 
considered as equal to 0. Therefore it is reasonable to 
consider the impact of the faults in terms of non-
presence of driver’s request at the Consumer side. The 
two conditions that can cause a loss of data transmission 
are: a faulty micro-controller (but under the fail silent 
assumption, no frame is transmitted in this case) or an 
error during the transmission of a data. An error at the 
communication level is the loss of a frame while an error 
at the system level is the loss of all the four replicated 
frames in one cycle for our case study. The failure of the 
vehicle occurs when the system error (i.e. absence of 
driver’s request at the Consumer side during one cycle) 
persists beyond a tolerable threshold in terms of the 
communication (or consumption) cycles. 
4.3. Determination of tolerable condition at vehicle 
level through fault injection technique 
Thanks to a fault injection campaign, we evaluate the 
situations in which the safety of the vehicle is ensured 
under a pattern of errors at system level, that is a 
distribution of the loss of cycles. This evaluation is based 
on Matlab/Simulink; we dispose of a model of the 
control law realizing the Consumer function. This model 
is, in fact a black box, provided by the supplier of front 
axle controller. The environment of this control law is 
modeled through SimulinkCar, a legacy tool developed 
by PSA Peugeot-Citroën. The available model for the 
control law allows observing the response of the vehicle 
in a driving condition: a turn at 90 Km/h. This driving 
condition is strictly identified and used, among some 
others, by automatic control specialists for the 
specification of the control law and is supposed to 
represent extreme driving conditions.  
The result furnished by an execution of these models 
consists in the evaluation of a couple of parameters, a 
"turn report" TR, and a "trajectory deviation" TD, that 
represent the global quality of the vehicle including the 
safety aspects. In preliminary studies, the designers of 
the vehicle define:  
- TRmin, the minimum value required for TR  
- and TDmax, the maximum value required for TD.  
We complete this model in order to represent on the 
one hand, the delay between a driver’s request 
production and its consumption (in fact, we consider 
always the worst case, i.e. WCPD) and, on the other 
hand, the discrete aspect of the driver’s request at the 
Matlab / Simulink model level. We are therefore able to 
test the quality of a system in terms of the vehicle 
stability subject to external faults by fault injection [11]; 
to do so, as said formerly, we consider that an error at 
the system level is the loss of a TDMA cycle. 
Thanks to the preliminary test activities, we remarked 
that, for the given case study, the worst condition is the 
one where several consecutive TDMA cycles are lost. 
This allows defining a test campaign policy based on 
two parameters, ti the initial instant of the loss of TDMA 
cycles sequence and ni the number of lost TDMA cycles:  
• for each couple (ti, ni), the "turn report", TRi,  and 
the trajectory deviation, TDi are measured, 
• then, we look at the lowest TRk that is superior or 
equal to TRmin (respectively, the greatest TDl that is 
inferior or equal to TDmax) and name STR 
(respectively STD) the set of couple (ti, ni) leading to 
the value TRk (respectively TDl)  
• finally, ηmax, the largest tolerable number of  TDMA 
cycles between the reception of two driver’s 
requests, is given by: 
max ( , )min ( )i i TR TDt n S S inη ∈ ∪=  
As a conclusion of this fault injection campaign, the 
safety of a system is guaranteed if the number of TDMA 
cycles between two correct receptions of driver’s 
requests, η, is less or equal to ηmax. 
For our case study, ηmax= 7. 
4.4. Error model 
As said in section 2.3, a road reference is 
characterized by a set of areas that are subject to 
electromagnetic interferences. This means that when a 
vehicle crosses these areas, the embedded architecture is 
possibly affected by external faults. We show, in this 
section, how it is possible to evaluate the probability to 
have an error in the system, error due to this external 
transient fault, during a TDMA cycle. This probability of 
losing a TDMA cycle, denoted by Perr, corresponds to 
losing all replicated data on the redundant channels. 
In general Perr can be obtained using fault injection 
techniques. However, in absence of the implemented 
system on which tests could be realized, we propose the 
following approach to estimate Perr. 
As it has been explained in section 4.2, we assumed 
the total reliability of the command ECUs and actuators; 
a system error can either be caused by the ECU faulty 
producing data or by transmission errors. If we denote by 
Perr_ECU the probability to have an error of all redundant 
ECUs, Perr_BUS the probability to have a transmission 
error of all redundant channels, and Perr_ECU∩BUS the 
probability to have both ECU and transmission error of 
all redundant ECU and channels, Perr can be obtained by: 
 
Perr = Perr_ECU + Perr_BUS - Perr_ECU∩BUS 
 
To capture the contribution of the redundancy, for 
each redundant component i (i could be ECU or BUS in 
our case), we propose a score of the diversification Ni 
(0≤Ni≤1). Assuming an error probability of a component, 
λi, the error probability of all the n redundant 
components can be estimated by: 
Perr_i = λi - Ni(λi -λin) 
For example, for 2 redundant channels, when the two 
cables use the same type of medium and follow the same 
wiring plan, they have great probability to be affected in 
the same way by an EMI perturbation. In this case the 
diversification score is near to 0, resulting in Perr_BUS 
near to λBUS. If the two channels use different mediums 
(e.g. one with optic fiber and another with metallic wire) 
and follow different wiring plans, they have smaller 
probability to be affected in the same way. The 
diversification score could be near to 1, resulting in 
Perr_BUS near to λBUS2. 
In our case study, Perr_ECU is much smaller than 
Perr_BUS. So we only take into account Perr_BUS and have 
thus Perr = Perr_BUS. According to [13] and some 
measurements, λBUS is approximately about 10-2. With 
Nbus = 0.5, we get: Perr  ≅ 5x10-3 
 
4.5. Duration of external faults 
A system embedded in a vehicle that crosses an area 
subject to EMI above the tolerable value (100 V/m) is 
possibly corrupted during a given time. In our approach, 
we consider that an error at system level is the non 
reception of a correct driver’s request for one TDMA 
cycle; so, the time interval during which the system can 
be corrupted has to be expressed in terms of a number of 
TDMA cycles. Furthermore, we consider a worst case 
condition for the vehicle; so the evaluation of this 
number of TDMA cycles is done for a vehicle crossing 
an critical area at 90 km/h. 
The first step consists in translating an area length 
expressed in meters in a length given in seconds (termed 
Z in the following). Once this done, we have to evaluate 
how many cycles are possibly corrupted. Figure 5 
illustrates how to evaluate this in the worst case. When 
t nε ε≤  (i.e., the filtering period is less than the TDMA 
cycle length), the worst case corresponds to the situation 
where all the replicated frames within the perturbation 
zone are corrupted and the end of the zone corrupts the 
beginning of the production of a TDMA cycle, causing 
thus an additional empty TDMA cycle. For the next 
valid TDMA cycle, as we assumed that the consumption 
takes place only after the last replica of a TDMA cycle, 
if this last replica is near the end of the TDMA cycle, it 
increases the worst interval between two valid driver’s 
requests by still another additional cycle. So this worst-
case interval is by: 
2WC
n
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ε
 
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Figure 5. Evaluation of the worst interval between 
two valid driver’s requests 
4.6. Behavioral reliability metrics 
In the previous sections, we detailed how to measure, 
WCη , the length of an area in terms of number of TDMA 
cycles between two valid instances of a driver’s request 
at their consumption instance, the probability, , that 
in a critical area, one TDMA cycle may be corrupted 
and, 
errP
maxη , the maximum tolerable length in terms of 
number of TDMA cycles between two valid instances of 
a driver’s request at their consumption instance  
Therefore, the behavioral reliability in a given critical 
area, defined by WCη , can be estimated by the 
probability to have an interval between two valid 
receptions of a driver’s request largest than maxη  under 
the assumption of a probability of corruption for one 
TDMA cycle . This problem is to be put together 
with the evaluation of reliability of a system composed 
of an ordered sequence of n components and such that 
the system fails if and only if at least k consecutive 
components fail. These systems are termed "consecutive-
errP
k-out-of-n:F" and denoted by C k . For such a 
system, we note n the number of components, p the 
probability that a component fails,  a number of 
consecutive failed components and k the largest tolerable 
number of consecutive failed components; the reliability 
of the system is evaluated by the probability that 
( , : )n F
nL
nL k< , 
that is noted by . This formula was 
proposed first in [14] and then simplified in [15] and 
[16] where q p : 
( )nP L k R< =
1= −
) /( 1)
0
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n k m m
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Thanks to this formula, we can express the probability, 
failP  that of a failure at the vehicle level by:  
( ,failP Z  
The numerical evaluation of the formula presented 
above is quite complex; so, we developed the following 
recurrent relation. 
Let u n , we can write: 
( 1u n  for n ≥ k 
This recurrent equation can be calculated with the 
following initial conditions: 
( )ku n =  for 0 ≤ n ≤  k-1 and  
kp
We assume that n ≥ 3 and ; by noting U(j) 
= P(Ln=j) and FR(j) = P(Ln≤j) with 0 ≤ j ≤  n,  the 
algorithm is therefore: 
 
// initialisation 
q=1-p; λ=q 
U(1)=q; FR(0)=qn 
For k=2 to n-1 do 
 // initial condition  
 U(k)=q+pU(k-1) 
U(k-1)=1 
λ=pλ 
 for j=k+1 to n do 
  U(j)=U(j-1)-λU(j-k) 
 FR(k-1)=U(n) 
// Evaluation of FR(n), U(n) 
FR(n-1)=1-pn 
FR(n)=1 
U(0)=FR(0) 
for k=1 to n do 
 U(k)=FR(k)-FR(k-1) 
 
In order to evaluate the risk of failure occurrences 
along a given route T, we have to apply this algorithm on 
each of the nZ identified critical areas (Zi) that may be 
crossed by the vehicle on this route. The probability, 
Pfail,T that a failure occurs on T is then given by: 
( )( )( ), max
1
1 , ( ); WC i
i nZ Z
fail T WC i err
i
P R Z P ηη η
=
∏
=
= −  
We applied this method in order to evaluate the 
behavioral reliability of the system presented in section 3 
and obtained the results presented in the next paragraph. 
5. Numerical result for a typical trajectory  
We studied the behavior of the vehicle along several 
significant routes. The one that we present here is typical 
of an urban environment. The values that we used were 
obtained thanks to the monitoring of the measured EMI 
in a vehicle driven along a route. Four critical areas were 
identified whose length in seconds (for a vehicle speed 
equal to 90 km/h) are respectively 2s, 50s, 20s and 2s. 
For each of these areas, the probability that a failure 
occurs at vehicle level was determined.   
We recall below the values computed for this case 
study: 
εn = 6 ms., the length of a TDMA cycle, 
Perr = 5x10-3, the probability that a TDMA cycle to be 
corrupted,  
ηmax = 7, the largest interval between two valid 
receptions of driver’s requests. 
Thanks to the algorithm presented in section 4.6, we 
obtain: 
-10
, 1.6409x10fail TP =  
If we consider the safety level required by SIL4 in [8] 
or 10-9 proposed in [7], or even 5.10-10 as suggested by 
PSA Peugeot-Citroën carmaker, we could conclude that 
the architecture of the case study meets the safety 
requirement. This is true even though SIL4 is expressed 
in terms of failures per hour, as the trajectory we 
considered is longer than one hour.  
The same method can be used in order to optimize the 
design of an application. In particular, it may be 
interesting to study how increasing the robustness of a 
network would improve the safety of the vehicle; this 
can be done by modifying the value of Perr (intuitively, 
the higher is the robustness of the network, the lower is 
Perr). Another important issue is to analyze the influence 
of the length, εn, of the TDMA cycle. For this purpose, 
we computed the value of ,fail TP  for several couples 
(εn,Perr). The results are presented in Table  1. 
The shaded region represents , i.e. the 
region within which the safety constraint is respected. 
We can see that for a same P
-10
, 5.10fail TP <
-7
, 10fail TP >
err, a shorter TDMA cycle 
provides more robustness. This is normal as for a same 
time period shorter TDMA cycle allows more temporal 
redundancy. The white region corresponds to 
. This region shows the margin a 
designer can have in terms of the TDMA cycle duration. 
The narrowness of this region says that to reduce the 
failure probability, it is often enough to just reduce a 
little the TDMA cycle duration. The region marked by 
“X” corresponds to the case of . 
-10 -7
,5.10 1.10fail TP< <
          1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0,5 X X X X X X X X X X
0,4 X X X X X X X X X X
0,3 X X X X X X X X X X
0,2 X X X X X X X X X
0,1 X X X X X X X X
0,09 X X X X X X X X
0,08 X X X X X X X
0,07 X X X X X X X
0,06 X X X X X X X
0,05 X X X X X X X
0,04 X X X X X X
0,03 X X X X X
0,02 X X X X X
0,01 X X X X
0,009 X X X X
0,008 X X
0,007 X X
0,006 X X
0,005 X X
0,004 X X
0,003 X X
0,002
0,001
TDMA cycle length (εn)
P e
rr
 
Table  1. Values obtained for the embedded 
architecture presented in the case study section for 
several quality of robustness of the network and 
several length of the TDMA cycle. 
6. Conclusion and future work 
X-by-Wire (Steer-by-Wire or Brake-by-Wire) 
systems are safety critical and their deployment is only 
possible with the proved dependability. In this paper we 
contributed to the method for evaluating the 
dependability of X-by-Wire systems taking into account 
the EMI perturbations. This method is designed for X-
by-Wire architectures distributed around TDMA-like 
communication network. Assuming a TDMA cycle error 
probability within an EMI perturbed zone, our method 
allows obtaining the vehicle level failure probability, 
which is an important quantitative dependability metric 
for the future certification process.  
Our future work includes the extension of the method 
to finer modeling the EMI perturbed zone by considering 
a variable Perr rather than a constant one, and a statistic 
study of a large set of typical trajectories for providing 
the failure probability per functioning hour so that 
IEC61508-1 can be applied to the automotive industry. 
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